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GALE ON REFERENCE AND
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Andrew V. Jeffrey

Richard Gale, in On the Nature and Existence of God, offers several reasons
why an "historical-cum-indexical" theory of reference cannot be appropriate
in explaining how people refer to God. The present paper identifies five
distinct lines of argument in Gale, attempts to clarify several important
desiderata for a successful theory of reference, and argues that Gale fails to
discharge the burden of proof he has assumed, leaving the most important
features of Alston's "direct reference" theory untouched. Nevertheless, it is
conceded that some consequences of Alston's theory are quite counter-intuitive. The paper therefore concludes with a consideration of two alternatives: either taking a hard, Alstonian line in conflict with people's linguistic
intuitions, or striking a compromise with descriptivism along lines similar
to those found in Gareth Evans's paper, "The Causal Theory of Names."

In the introduction and the eighth chapter of his recent book, On the
Nature and Existence of God, Richard Gale offers several arguments
against the adequacy of a direct reference theory for the term 'God'.'
After setting the context of this discussion, this paper shall divide Gale's
comments on reference into five specific arguments and then discuss
each argument. It is concluded that although some descriptivist element
may be necessary to an account of how 'God' refers, Gale's arguments
fall short of showing this to be so.
The entire discussion concerning reference can be set, for our purposes, in the context of Gale's criticism of William Alston's epistemology of
religious experience." Alston advocates a theory according to which the
criteria for justified judgements or reasonable beliefs vary with the subject matter in question and with the socially established belief-forming
practice engaged in when forming beliefs about that subject-matter. 3 His
view is semi-Wittgensteinian in that he simultaneously rejects
Wittgenstein's alleged verificationism while accepting the epistemological pluralism implicit in the Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty."
He therefore asserts that many (if not all) of these practices, while having the common cognitive goal of truth (in the realist sense of correspondence with mind-independent fact), cannot be adversely judged (much
less dismissed) for failing to come up to anyone universal standard of
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epistemic rationality.5 On such pluralistic grounds, Alston argues that
religious belief-forming practices, specifically what he calls "the
Christian mystical practice," should be considered on a near-par with
sense-perceptual practice."
An initial objection Gale poses to Alston's defense of the evidential
status of religious experience is that whereas existential claims about
physical objects ultimately rest on sensory experience, "claims about the
existence and nature of God need not [sic], and typically are not, based
on religious experience, and thus religious experiences are not constitutive of the religious language game."7 Gale claims that rather than using
their own or others' religious experiences to anchor their ostensibly referential uses of the name 'God', believing participants typically "do so
via the use of descriptions .... " He concludes: "Religious experiences
are not constitutive of any doxastic practice, but instead are an inessential part of the encompassing religious language game."s Gale's demand
that religious experience be "constitutive" of the religious language is
based on a comparison with our sense perceptual knowledge of the
physical universe. The basic idea is that religious doxastic practices
must resemble our doxastic practices concerning the physical world in
every important respect if the former are to approximate the latter's cognitive respectability.
But, Gale notes, Alston has a reply to the above objection. 9 Alston
accepts a theory of direct reference according to which the reference of a
word need not be mediated through any associated descriptive sense. 1D
Any good theory of reference is going address two distinct issues. First,
it has to give an account of how the references of genuinely referring
expressions are originally fixed. Second, it must also give an account of
how reference is transmitted, or of how language users employ two
tokens of a term or sign to refer to the same thing. Alston holds, for
example, that the reference of 'God' in the Christian community's nonexperiential doxastic practices (forming beliefs via consultation with religious authorities and teachers, consulting scriptures, reading and doing
theology, etc.), as well as in its non-doxastic practices (worship, prayer,
etc.), is originally pinned down by or historically grounded upon primordial religious encounters, such as, perhaps, God's revelation to
Abraham. The perpetuation of coreferential uses of 'God' then involves
the name's being passed on from person to person, with the vital condition being that each new individual learning the name intends to use it
with the same reference as the person from whom she heard it. Alston
never denies that descriptivist modes of reference are also employed in
talk about God; his claims are rather, first, that the employment of identifying descriptions is not the only way to refer to God, and second, that
direct reference is "more fundamental" to talk about God than descriptivist reference. l1
Gale's opposing theory is mainly descriptivist with some "historicalcausal" elements thrown in. He employs what he calls a "bundle version of the cluster theory," according to which the reference of 'God' is
both originally fixed and principally transmitted via a set of associated
descriptions that gains some members and loses others over timeY On
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such an account, a reference might be fixed via one description in one
generation, but associated with very different descriptions by subsequent generations, reference being preserved across generations by the
later cluster of descriptions' being historically connected to earlier clusters in appropriate ways. Gale allows that reference to God might be
secured in non-descriptive ways some of the time, but he rejects the
notion of an original ostensive "baptism" mediated by a revelatory religious experience. That descriptivist modes of reference are employed in
talk about God is therefore not a point of dispute between Gale and
Alston; rather, their dispute centers around the ways in which the reference of 'God' might have been initially fixed, and the relative priority of
the different modes of reference in transmission. According to Gale,
contemporary religious sophisticates paradigmatically fix their reference
to God using definite descriptions which also perform an overrider
function in theological discourse by limiting the degree to which conceptions of God can vary and still be conceptions of the same thing. 13 For
Alston, the individual's reference to God is typically fixed without
employing any definite descriptions through learned usage in a religious community, or through a linguistic community's association with
a religious community.14
By this author's count, Gale advances five specific objections to what
he calls Alston's "historical-cum-indexical" theory of reference as
applied to the term 'God'.JS Let us call these objections the Non-ostensibility Objection, the Definition Objection, the Ontological
Presuppositions Objection, the Opinion Poll Objection, and the Biblical
Illiteracy Objection. In offering these objections, Gale has assumed the
burden of proof for descriptivism and against Alston's direct reference
theory. In what follows, it will be argued that Gale fails to completely
discharge the burden he has assumed.
The Non-ostensibility Objection

The first objection appears in the introduction of Gale's book:
First, because God is a supernatural being, he seems to defy
being indexically pinned down or baptized. There are no lapels
to be grabbed hold of by a use of "this." Some would contend
that we can ostensively pin down the name "God" by saying
"this" when having or after just having a mystical or religious
experience, in which "this" denotes the intentional accusative or
content of the experience. This would seem to require that these
experiences are cognitive and that their objective accusative is a
common object of the experiences of different persons as well as
of successive experiences of a single person .... 16
Gale's point is that the applicability of an historical-cum-indexical
theory of reference to 'God' presupposes the cognitivity (and hence the
veridicality) of theistic experience, i.e., that the experiences actually represent contact with a genuine supernatural being; but in the chapter on
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religious experience in the same book, Gale advances a complicated
argument against the veridicality of religious experiences based on what
he takes to be a priori requirements for veridicality that the putative
objects of religious experiences typically cannot satisfy. As this argument is rather detailed, and involves issues other than those directly
connected with reference, it cannot be dealt with in this paper. The
point that needs to be made at present is that the religious languagegame could be played as if theistic experiences were both veridical and
cognitive even if they actually were not; i.e., people could play the referential game even with a radically misidentified referent. Thus, Gale's
argument against the veridicality of religious experiences turns out to be
compatible with the historical-causal component of Alston's theory of
reference for 'God'. As Gale has subsequently remarked, so long as it
did not presuppose an initial ostensive baptism, he would have little
quarrel with a theory of reference for 'God' that explained sameness of
reference over time in terms of lineages of linguistic usage. '7 In the same
place, Gale distinguishes between "indexical", "externalist", and "intentional" versions of the causal theory of reference. He identifies Alston's
view as an externalist theory, according to which "the referent picked up
... is whatever was in fact the external cause of the seminal religious
experiences."" Both the externalist and intentional theories can be "historical-sans-indexical" in the sense that they base sameness of reference
on lineages of linguistic usage, while being compatible with the impossibility of indexically referring to God; but the "intentional" version
favoured by Gale also postulates a shared core of associated descriptions. To see why, let us turn to Gale's second major line of attack on
direct reference for 'God'.

The Definition Objection
The passage in which Gale presents his Non-Ostensibility Objection
continues:
A second disanalogy between "God" and the sort of ordinary
proper names to which the historical-cum-indexical reference
theory applies is that whereas it is not an analytic truth or true
by definition that the referent of an ordinary proper name satisfy some description ... this does not appear to be so for "God".
At any time at which "God" is used there will be some descriptive sense that it has by definition. For example, at the present
time it is analytically true that God is a powerful, benevolent
being that is eminently worthy of worship and obedience. To
this extent, "God" is not distinguishable from a natural-kind
term, which also can have at any time a descriptive sense that is
definitionally determined. But they part company because some
of the descriptive properties that are definitionally tied to God
are hard core in that we would not allow a use of "God" to be
coreferring with ours if these properties were not at least partially constitutive of the sense of the name. 1Y
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These "hard core" properties are "high-level, emergent properties, ... an
individual can have ... only in virtue of the possession of other, lowerlevel properties."20 Gale contrasts these hard core properties with "soft
core" descriptive properties, which, on his version of historical-causal
theory, can alter over time without compromising sameness of reference.
Gale gives the changing meaning of 'gold' as an example:
The historical-causal theory of reference also applies to names of
natural kinds. Consider "gold" in this connection. We begin by
ostending a paradigmatic class of specimens of gold. We then
turn our scientists loose to investigate the nature or essence of
these specimens. As time goes by we revise our definition of
what constitutes the essential properties of gold, which is what
in fact happened as the alchemist's theory gave way to that of
modern atomic theory. Thus, the descriptive sense a name
might have at some time is not inviolable in that a later use of it
can be co referring even though it lacks this descriptive sense,
due to a change in our definition of this natural kind. 2J
Again, note that Gale is combining historical-causal and descriptivist
theories. Kripke would deny that natural kind terms have any descriptive senses. 22 Also, it seems that since Gale offers the presence of hardcore properties in the descriptive sense of 'God' as something that distinguishes 'God' from natural-kind terms, he holds all the properties
constitutive of the senses of ordinary natural-kind terms to be of the
soft-core variety.
The objection to a purely causal theory of the reference of 'God' that
can be extracted from the above passages is that 'God' is significantly
disanalogous both to ordinary proper names, the most obvious candidates for a historical-cum-indexical theory of reference, as well as to natural kind terms, which are also sometimes understood to refer in virtue
of an historical connection to some original ostensive baptism. It is disanalogous to proper names in always having a descriptive sense. It is
disanalogous to natural kind terms in that its sense includes hard-core
properties upon which coreference depends, and, although this does not
follow from the account given, but is argued for separately, its descriptive sense does not permit indexical reference. 2 ' All of these alleged dissimilarities, but especially the having of an invariant descriptive sense,
are such as to render a causal theory of reference inadequate or at least
incomplete when it comes to explaining coreference in the case of 'God'.
There are at least two responses to this objection. First, Gale's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, it is not really clear that 'God'
always has some associated descriptive sense such that nothing counts
as God unless it satisfies the relevant description. It could be conceded
that if one attended exclusively to the philosophical literature on the
subject, or to the dogmatic theology of various organized religions, one
might be tempted to suppose with Gale that power, benevolence, and
worthiness of worship were analytic of the concept of God. But, as anyone who has ever taught an introductory course in the philosophy of
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religion knows, many students will question these alleged linguistic
truths in a way they would never question, say, the masculinity of bachelors. If one is taking the concept of God most commonly employed in
our culture, and not merely a philosophically refined version of that
concept as the object of one's philosophical inquiry, then these students'
contentiousness cannot be put down to mere linguistic incompetence in
the area of God-talk.'" Even among the theological elite, that God possesses attributes such the ones under consideration is open to dispute in
a way that simple analytic truths would not be. 20 If possession of these
properties is analytic of the concept of God some person employs, it can
only be because he or she has determined to use 'God' in such a way as
to make this true.
Second, even if it were conceded for the sake of argument that 'God'
always had some descriptive sense or other, it would still be the case
that its being associated with a cluster of definite descriptions was a logically distinct thesis from the claim that the term referred in virtue of
(some set of) those descriptions. What a term means is a question of
what descriptions language users might substitute for it in a given context. How a term refers is quite another matter. One source of this doctrine of the independence of meaning and reference is Kripke's Naming
and Necessity. In it, Kripke draws a sharp distinction between theories
of reference and theories of meaning. 26 He also claims that:
... in the case of species terms as in that of proper names, ...
one should bear in mind the contrast between the a priori but
perhaps contingent properties a term may carry, given by the
way its reference was fixed, and the analytic (and hence necessary) properties a term may carry, given by its meaning. For
species, as for proper names, the way the reference of a term is
fixed should not be regarded as a synonym for the term.27
Kripke in fact thinks a natural kind term's reference could be fixed via
a description without that term's thereby being synonymous with that
or any other description. os If a term's reference is fixed descriptively, as
Kripke admits was the case with the planet Neptune (79n), then it could
be said that the term in question had a descriptive sense, but this sense
still wouldn't be a synonym for the term. Remember that Kripke criticizes Frege for conflating two separate senses of 'sense:' u . . . for he takes
the sense of a designator to be its meaning; and he also takes it to be the
way its reference is determined."29 And if the reference of a term is fixed
non-descriptively, say, via indexical dubbing, it is hard to see how there
could even be a question of synonymy.
Now it is one thing to suppose, as Kripke does, that a term could refer
in virtue of some description without that description's capturing the
meaning of (and thus being synonymous with) that term, and quite
another to suppose that it is also possible that a term's meaning could be
captured by some description without that term's referring in virtue of
that or any description. Yet (apart from Kripke's reservations about natural kind terms' ever having synonymous descriptions) the latter is not
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logically incompatible with the former. Moreover, something like the
latter circumstance is alleged to occur on Gale's view, at least as regards
'gold'. If alchemical and post-alchemical uses of the term are coreferring, then either their senses jointly share something like hard-core
properties in addition to the changing ones/o or the two uses corefer in
virtue of a common history going back to original cases of ostensive
dubbing, and not in virtue of a common sense at all. With respect to natural-kind terms, Gale plainly prefers the second disjunct. But, if 'gold"s
having (at some time t) a descriptive meaning does not tell us what the
circumstances are in which 'gold' refers, why should we take it that the
having, even if at all times, of the same descriptive meaning tells us what
the circumstances are in which 'God' refers? The answer cannot simply
be because some features of the latter term's descriptive meaning remain
unaltered and ipso facto shared over epoches. To use this alleged disanalogy in the character of the term's descriptive meaning to show that
its mechanism of reference is different begs the question. To show that
'God' must refer descriptively, it must be shown that some descriptive
properties built into the definition of 'God' are essential to successful
coreference--thus making 'God' an exception to the rule that applies to
natural-kind terms. Gale only asserts this to be the case. Yet since he
embraces the doctrine of the independence of meaning and reference
with respect to natural-kind terms, he surely needs more than the availability of an alternative account of reference to demonstrate that a causal
account alone would be incomplete in the case of 'God'. He needs other,
independent grounds for supposing the causal theory of reference to be
insufficient in the case of 'God' before he offers hard core properties as
an alternative explanation for sameness of reference."1
Against the thesis that reference can be divorced from meaning, it
could be argued that if the reference of 'God' were fixed by saying "God
is the object I directly experienced last night," the way this reference is
fixed would be incompatible with its being analytically true, for
instance, that God is a powerful, benevolent being that is eminently worthy of worship. For, if the latter is what is meant by 'God', then if the
label 'God' refers at all, it refers to something that is powerful, benevolent, and worthy of worship, and the object I experienced last night
might lack these properties. 32
There are at least two responses to the objection outlined in the paragraph above. The first stems from Kripke's pragmatic distinction
between speaker's reference and semantic reference. 33 Although the following is not an exact quote, semantic reference can be defined as the
reference of a designator as determined by the conventions of a speaker's idiolect or language, given various facts about the world. 34 Kripke
(tentatively) defines the speaker's referent as that object which the
speaker "wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills
the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator."35 This
distinction is, in and of itself, neutral with respect to descriptivist versus
causal accounts of how the (semantic) reference of 'God' is fixed, but
notice: given this distinction and a descriptivist account of the reference
of 'God', a speaker could use 'God' to refer to an entity she encountered
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the previous evening, and thereby be implying that the being she
encountered was necessarily powerful, benevolent, and eminently worthy of worship. Likewise, on a causal-historical account of the reference
of 'God', philosophical theologians may be using 'God' to talk about an
hypothetical being necessarily possessing various attributes, and be
wrongly (or rightly but serendipitously) attributing these attributes to a
real entity. The point in either case seems to be that the speech-act by
which a speaker fixes the referent of a term on a given occasion need not
be compatible with the semantic analysis of the term.
Secondly, even if the distinction between speaker's reference and
semantic reference does not falsify the objector's argument, there is a
question about the argument's validity. The premise of the argument is
that if a there is some description that could, contra Kripke, be substituted for a general term as its meaning in a particular context, then there
could not be another description, distinct from the first, in virtue of
which the term refers. If by 'God' one means "whatever I encountered
last night," then one does not mean "a being that is powerful, benevolent, and eminently worthy of worship." Of course, it could turn out to
be true of the being encountered that it was powerful, benevolent, and
eminently worthy of worship. And thus one could, in using 'God' in the
first sense, be referring to a being answering to the latter description. 36
But one couldn't insist that some description encapsulated what one
meant by a term, and still claim that one was fixing the reference of that
term via an entirely different description.
But none of the above is sufficient to warrant the clause, "it is this
meaning in virtue of which 'God' refers, if it refers at all." This clause
says that if a term has a descriptive meaning, then that meaning must be
that in virtue of which the term refers. But all the first point really
shows is that if a term has a synonymous description, its reference cannot be fixed by another, entirely distinct description. It does not rule out
the possibility that a term could be synonymous with a description (or
disjunction of descriptions), yet refer in virtue of something entirely other
than a description, such as a causal history.37 The point again is that such
facts about a term's meaning may hold even though it is still the case
that the term refers solely in virtue of a historical relation to some original ostensive dubbing.
The upshot of this discussion is as follows. Gale allows that a causalhistorical theory of reference is necessary to account for the coreferential
use of natural-kind terms through meaning-shifts, in so far as these
terms allegedly lack senses involving hard core properties. So, even if a
term has a sense or synonymous description, this doesn't preclude its
referring in virtue of an historical connection to an ostensive dubbing.
While Gale writes as if the alleged disanalogy between the descriptive
senses of 'God' and natural kind terms constituted an independent reason for supposing that a purely causal theory could not completely
account for the reference of 'God', it turns out that the type of disanalogy alleged to exist, a disanalogy in how the associated senses of the
respective terms fix their referents, presupposes the necessity of a descriptivist account, thereby begging the question. It may be that the necessity
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of a descriptivist account can be demonstrated by one of Gale's remaining three objections. But, as we shall see, each of these objections have
problems of their own.

The Ontological Presuppositions Objection
Gale supports his Non-ostensibility Objection with a complex argument against Alston's supposition that God could be the object of a
veridical perception, and hence the subject of an ostensive "baptism."
But he also objects that a good theory of reference for the term 'God'
should make no presuppositions about whether God exists:
That [two uses of 'God'] are coreferring should be independent
of God's existence, and this should hold even if the referrers
take having necessary existence to be one of God's hard-core
properties, which would not be the case if the referent of "God"
had to be pinned down indexically.3R
And on page 301 he adds:
Another fundamental inadequacy in Alston's causal theory of
reference for 'God' is that it cannot account for how two persons
who use 'God' can be coreferrers even if God does not exist. As
argued in Chapter 1 [sic], our use of 'God' allows for such a case
of intentional identity.
At first glance, if one has Alston's indexical-causal theory in mind,
one might take these two passages to be expressing precisely the same
point. But in fact these passages make subtly different claims, as shall be
shown shortly.
Now it is obvious that if an expression lacks a referent, then no two
individuals using it are coreferring, because neither one of them is referring. But that is as true for descriptivism as it is for the causal theory.
The problem Gale has got his finger on is really not about coreference,
but, as he puts it elsewhere, about intentional identity.39 How can the
causal theorist account for two theologians' expressing the same proposition, or even for their being able to disagree, without presupposing the
existence of the referent? In the case where two individuals intend to be
speaking of the same thing but are both mistaken in their belief that this
thing exists or ever has existed, Gale thinks that we can only make sense
of the intentional identity exhibited in their speech by positing some
associated set of descriptions which both speakers have in mind. With
this clarification made, the argument from intentional identity against a
causal theory of reference for the term 'God' might be put as follows:
(1) An adequate account of intentional identity should not presup-

pose the existence of a term's referent.
(2) A causal theory of reference for 'God' must presuppose that God
exists (or at least once did exist).
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(3) Therefore, a causal theory of reference cannot supply an adequate
account of how intentional identity is preserved in talk about
God.
The first premise is motivated by the intuition that we can enter into
common discourse about entities even when these entities are fictive or
mythical. The reason for (2) is supposed to go like this: On a descriptivist account, sameness of intentional object occurs when two language
users employing a term have the same descriptive sense, or at least a
sufficient number of clauses from an associated bundle of descriptions,
in mind. The existence of the referent is not necessary. But how else, if
not by presupposing God's existence, can a causal theory of reference for
the term 'God' explain intentional identity in talk about God? This is
where the subtle distinction between the two passages quoted above
comes in. If by a causal theory of reference one means an indexicalcausal theory, the above argument is surely sound-but not because of
its causal elements. An indexical theory concerning how a term acquires
its reference surely must presuppose the existence of its referent. But it
is the causal-historical component of Alston's theory, the part concerning how the reference of a term is transmitted from one person to another, that would have to be refuted in order to show the necessity of
descriptivism. And a good case can be made for the claim that a causal
theory of (co-)reference need not presuppose a real-world referent.
To begin with, the assumption that intentional identity requires a
descriptive backing needs to be questioned. Gareth Evans, in criticizing
the view that "to have an intention or belief concerning some item
(which one is not in a position to demonstratively identify) one must be
in possession of a description uniquely true of it", remarks:
We constantly use general terms of whose satisfaction conditions we have but the faintest idea. "Microbiologist," "chlorine"
(the stuff in swimming pools), "nicotine" (the stuff in cigarettes);
these (and countless other words) we cannot define nor offer
remarks which would distinguish their meaning from that of
closely related words. It is wrong to say that we say nothing by
uttering sentences containing these expressions, even if we
recoil ... from saying that what we say is determined by those
hazy ideas and half-identifications we would offer if pressed:o
But if it is false that even a single speaker need be able to supply a
uniquely identifying description of that about which she speaks, how
could such a description be a necessary condition for intentional identity
of reference between two speakers? Again, Gareth Evans:
A group of people are having a conversation in a pub, about a
certain Louis of whom S has never heard before. S becomes
interested and asks: 'What did Louis do then?' There seems to
be no question but that S denotes a particular man and asks
about him. Or on some subsequent occasion S may use the
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name to offer some new thought to one of the participants:
'Louis was quite right to do that.' Again he clearly denotes
whoever was the subject of conversation in the pub. This is difficult to reconcile with the description theory since the scraps of
information which he picked up during the converstion might
involve some distortion and fit someone else much better.41
The same considerations will apply in religious contexts. A six-year old
is already just as capable of referring to God as an adult, in virtue of her
membership in the same linguistic community. Yet if one asked the sixyear old who she thought God was, one might be told that God was a
person who lived a long time ago when there weren't any shoes, and
that God took care of the animals and had the only cup-everyone else
had to drink out of their hands. Theology and even worship are a ways
off, developmentally speaking. So, in some sense, there is a difference
between what she and the rest of us mean by 'God', where speaker's
meaning is understood in terms of the alternative descriptions the
speaker offers in explaining his or her use of a phrase. But that does not
mean there is any difference in what we refer to. Finally, if it is implausible to suppose that we need attach equivalent descriptive senses to a
term in order to corefer with each other, it is even more implausible to
suppose such a requirement would hold in the case of coreference across
epochs. Historically, the real Abraham could have been a henotheist,
the concept of monotheism having developed later in the Prophetic Era.
Yet knowing this, someone in the Judeo-Christian tradition today could
still insist that she worshipped the God of Abraham.
On a causal theory of reference, a language-user's intention to use a
term as the other members of his or her social group use it is sufficient
for sameness of reference or intentional identity. Following Donnellan,
we can say that when the history of a singular term begins in a way that
precludes a real world referent from being identified, it ends in a
"block"42 For example, if someone began using a proper name from a
fictitious story in the mistaken belief that the story was a factual account,
the history of that person's use of that name ends in a block Donnellan
suggests that a negative existence statement is true just in case the history of the singular term in the statement ends in a block To counter the
objection that this account seems to make the truth of negative existence
statements depend upon facts about language, e.g., the history of a
proper name, rather than upon facts about the world, Donnellan also
suggests that two distinct negative existence statements-with different
singular terms-can express the same proposition if the blocks in the
histories of the terms are related in the right way. Thus, when an
American child says "Santa Claus does not exist," and a French child
says "Pere Noel n' e;iste pas," the two are both expressing the same proposition about the world. If Donnellan is right, then we can conclude that
when two or more uses of a term end in a common "block," or in blocks
sharing the right kind of historical connection, the statements in which
these uses appear preserve intentional identity, i.e., are "about the same
thing," despite the statements' lack of a real world referent. 43 It further
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follows that whether a singular term refers to an actual object is equally
beside the point on either a descriptivist or a causal theory of reference.

The Opinion Poll and Biblical Illiteracy Objections
In his chapter on religious-experience arguments, Gale adds two final
reasons for rejecting the appropriateness of applying a "historical-cumindexical reference theory" to uses of 'God'.
Alston, following his aforementioned theory to one of its consequences, rhetorically asks, if it were the case that the Biblical patriarches
had actually been in effective contact with Satan rather than God, wouldn't the Christian community have to admit that it was, "despite our
bandying about of descriptions that fit the only true God," referring to
and thus addressing Satan in its prayers and worship, and thus a Satanworshipping community?4' But while he clearly intends this hypothetical
question to be answered affirmatively, he seems to have given Gale the
key to his own rebuttal, for Gale reports that in his own informal poll of
religious believers, using the very question Alston asked, all the believers
he asked disagreed with Alston, replying negatively. Gale takes this uniform rejection of Alston's hypothetical conclusion as good anecdotal evidence against Alston's theory as to how coreferential uses of the term
'God' actually work in religious practice, concluding:
I do not doubt that there are Orthodox Jews and Christian
Fundamentalists whose religious language game fits Alston's
causal theory of reference, but it certainly does not properly
describe the religious language game of Phil QUinn's "intellectually sophisticated adults in our culture," many of whom are
ignorant of which Biblical dignitaries were alleged to have had
religious experiences, and thus cannot be picking up the referent
of "God" from them and who, moreover, would not accept the
characterization of themselves as devil worshipers or LSD worshipers, if it should turn out to be the case that the experiences
of these dignitaries were caused by the devil or LSD.45
So here we have the last two objections to Alston's account of how
'God' refers, and thus to treating religious experience as constitutive of
Christian doxastic practice. The first is that, by their own account, the
religious language-game of the "intellectually sophisticated adults in
our culture" fixes the reference of 'God' via metaphysical descriptions.
The second is that in order for them to be acquiring the reference of
'God' via Biblical or other historical encounters with God, these intellectual (but not necessarily Biblically literate) sophisticates must know
which persons originally had these alleged encounters.
Let us address the last point first, as it can be dealt with in short order
by remarking that Gale is clearly mistaken in thinking that these intellectual sophisticates would have to be able to pick out specific experients,
Biblical or otherwise, to successfully corefer with them. It is as if he were
thinking of the direct reference theory as another version of the theory of
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descriptions, one that differed simply in proposing an alternative set of
descriptions, i.e., "The God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob," instead of "He
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-conceived." Instead, coreference only
requires that the contemporary users of the term 'God' intend to use it in
the same way as those from whom they heard it. This proximate causal
connection, repeated over and over again, is all that is required for there
to be the right sort of external, historical connection between contemporary usage and the experience of the seminal Biblical referrers.
As for the Opinion Poll Objection, there are two plausible responses
available to the causal theorist. The first is to reply that Gale's poll only
shows how people think reference is fixed in their language-game. We
should not be surprised that the religious individuals polled would answer
Alston's rhetorical question in the manner they did. Psychologically, being
told that one might be unintentionally worshipping Satan would be like
hearing it insinuated that one was the very sheltered child of a mafioso,
only worse. Moreover, the reaction is probably paralleled by other
responses to counter-intuitive results which accompany direct reference
theories. Consider, for example, how many people might be surprised by
this conclusion of Donnellan's regarding Santa Claus:
Suppose, for example, that contrary to what we adults believe
we know, there is, in fact, a man with a long white beard and a
belly like a bowl full of jelly who comes down chimneys on
Christmas night to leave gifts (the ones whose labels are missing
about which parents worry because they don't know what aunt
the child should write a thank-you note). We must, of course,
imagine that it is absolutely fortuitous that our descriptions of
Santa Claus happen to fit so accurately this jolly creature. In
that case I do not think that he is Santa Claus. The fact that the
story of Santa Claus, told to children as fact, is historically an
invention constitutes a block even if the story happens to contain only descriptions that accurately fit some person. 4h
One suspects that a great many people would find this result of a
direct reference theory unintuitive-they would want to say, if such a
case came to light, "Well, we thought we were pulling one over on the
kids, but, what do you know, there really is a Santa Claus!" (They
would be wrong, and in fact engaging in a new dubbing of the jolly creature described above, but that is how they would see it.)
Gale, in correspondence with the author, claims that Donnellan's
Santa Claus example exhibits the same sort of semantic-pragmatic confusion which Kripke uncovered in Donnellan's referential! attributive
distinction. 47 Seeing the Santa Claus story as an instance of fictive discourse, Gale argues it would be perfectly appropriate to react with "Yes,
Virginia, there really is a Santa Claus."
I see the fictive use of language as a special sort of illocutionary
act that has the normative upshot, provided there is no misfire
due to insincerity and the like, of freeing the author from any
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challenge of speaking falsely, at least in regard to the singular
propositions he expresses. That it would be inappropriate,
unfair if you like, to charge the author with saying something
false about a real life person, does not entail that he does not do
so. Thus, there is no semantic "block" in fictional references,
only an illocutionary block to the appropriateness of trying to
find a real life referent and verify whether it has the fictionally
described properties. 48

But this is certainly not the way a causal theorist, least of all Kripke
himself, need see things. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke considers the
hypothetical discovery of fossils that superficially resemble the mythical
unicorns and claims that these fossils would not be the remains of unicorns unless the myths were somehow historically connected with, and
therefore about, these ancient animals,,9 Just as in the Santa Claus example, others might say, "Well! Unicorns really existed after all." Kripke,
like Donnellan in the Santa case, would regard these people's intuitions
to be mistaken unless such an historical link could be established. Also,
Kripke explicitly states that he does not regard his criticisms of
Donnellan's referential! attributive distinction to be incompatible with
his views on the reference of proper names, which are quite similar to
Donnellan's.50
Alternatively, respect for the clear-cut intuitions of Gale's respondents might lead one to seek a middle ground between Gale and Alston,
acknowledging, in the words of Gareth Evans, that "the intentions of the
speakers to use [a name or general term] to refer to something must be
allowed to count in determination of what it denotes."'1 Alston would
reply that this only showed that "one would not use 'God' to refer to X
unless one firmly believed X alone had certain characteristics."s2
But that falls short of showing that it is the possession of those
characteristics that makes X the referent. The arguments for the
primacy of direct reference remain in full full force .... Our
dupes of Satan might have a firm resolution to use 'God' to refer
only to a being that is absolutely perfect; but, mistakenly supposing the being with whom they are in contact to be absolutely
perfect, they are using 'God' to refer to an imperfect being
nonetheless. 53
To further support this reply, Alston draws an analogy to Donnellan's
case of the misdescribed imbiber. In that case, because the speaker has a
way of directly picking out the referent, he can use a description to pick
out a referent that does not satisfy the description. So, in the case of referential uses of 'God', Alston adds, "Here too it could well be the case
that one would not use that description to refer to X unless one believed
X uniquely satisfies the description; but the referent is determined otherwise nonetheless."s.
The plausibility of this reply depends on the relevance of the following disanalogy between the two cases. Donnellan's mistaken speaker at
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the party employs a description in an exceptional way; it is a case of a
pragmatic glitch in a linguistic practice where speaker's reference and
semantic meaning would normally coincide. But in the case of Alston's
mistaken Satan-worshippers, we have to imagine a linguistic practice
where speakers' reference and semantic meaning continually and systematically fail to coinicide. It's like being asked to imagine that people
unwittingly entertain radically false beliefs about rhinoceroses every
time they talk or think about 'unicorns', despite whatever descriptions
and images they employ, on the grounds that the first Western account
of unicorns was that of the Greek Historian Ctesias, who is thought to
have been relating fanciful reports of the Indian rhino. 55 It's easy to see
why such a global disparity between the semantics and pragmatics of a
linguistic practice would lead philosophers to call for an adjustment to
the semantic theory that posited iU6
How are we to understand the relation between the descriptive constraints arrived at through theological reflection and usage, on the one
hand, and historical-causal mechanisms of reference-transmission in the
religious tradition, on the other? Worship and prayer commonly borrow definite descriptions from theology in addressing their object.
Theological reflection, although certainly dependent on the more
"undergirding substance of religious activity," is not epiphenomenal to
it. The relation, in other words, between prayer, worship, and other
instances of "first order" religious language to the "second order" language of theological reflection, is not a one-way street. Theological
reflection, originating in worship and prayer, in turn informs and otherwise affects the activities it reflects upon. Thus, if the reference of terms
in theological discourse is sometimes fixed via definite descriptions
(which, Alston concedes, is possible)," the same may be true of the reference of these terms when (re)employed in prayer and worship.
An analogue of Evans's idea of "dominance" may be of service at this
point. Evans proposes that speakers generally intend to refer to the item
which is the causally dominant source of the information they associate
with the term in question. 5" Dominance is "not merely a function of the
amount of information," it is also a funtion of informational detail and
significance, as well as of deference to special groups of speakers within
the linguistic community. 59 But since Alston assumes that what a speaker intends to refer to does not always guarantee what she actually refers
to, Evans's original idea will require modification if it is to be of use in
the present context. In any case where an item is ostensibly re-identified
over time, there is the possibility of misidentification. In such cases, the
Alstonian assumption would seem to be that the item picked out in the
initial dubbing, whether ostensively or descriptively, will subsequently
always be the real referent of the term. This does not allow for changes
in denotation, which do occur. Evans, for instance, cites the case of
'Madagascar,' where " ... 'a heresay report of Malay or Arab sailors ...
has had the effect of transferring a corrupt form of the name of a portion
of the African mainland to the great African Island."'6Q
We should reject, then, the suggestion that causal chains of linguistic
usage must always be linear, with the denotation of a term remaining
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inflexibly that of its original referent. Instead, let us suppose that where
there have been multtple re-identifications (and possible mis-identificatios) over time, a term's semantic referent is that item dominantly picked
out among the items that may have been speakers' referents at one time
or another-and this need not remain the original referent of the term.
This view still allows that the original reference could remain dominant,
and so it does not automatically rule out Alston's Satanic Dupes scenario, but it does more justice to the intuitions of Gales' respondents,
and allows for the possibilty of changes in denotation in a way Alston's
theory apparantly does not. It will also allow for a better understanding
of religious syncretism, which figures importantly in the history of all
major world religions, and thus in the histories of religious terms, thereby also affecting reference in present-day religious discourse. When, for
instance, an indigenous name of a local deity with its own etymology
and cultural connotations is appropriated by missionaries to refer to the
god of another religion, it would seem we must say that a descriptively
based refixing of the name's reference occurs. But this is still compatible
with this new reference then being transmitted non-descriptively via the
missionary community's distinctive usage.
Finally, suppose that 'God' really is linguistically associated with a
certain cluster of descriptions, that 'God' really does mean such-andsuch. How would a causal theory of reference accommodate this fact?
In the case of 'heat', we originally fix the reference of the term in this
and every possible world via a contingent fact about the sensation it produces in us in the real world. 61 It is not discoverable a priori or through
conceptual analysis alone that heat just is molecular motion; therefore
being molecular motion is not built into the meaning of 'heat', even if it
does turn out to be heat's essence. The way we originally fix the reference of 'heat', by reference to experienced but contingent and therefore
inessential qualities, does not preclude us from later affirming truths
about its essence. On a historical-cum-indexical account, the same is
true with respect to talk of God, i.e., the reference of 'God' is originally
fixed by reference to experiences, ostensibly involving qualities which
mayor may not be essential to God's nature. As it happens, supreme
greatness and eminent worthiness of worship, the properties Gale identifies as "hard core" for God, are properties someone having a numinous
experience could certainly ascribe to the intentional object of his or her
experience. Indeed, whereas many philosophers have wondered how
God could possibly be experienced as omnipotent or omniscient, relatively few have regarded mystical accounts of intuited divine greatness
and worthiness as problematic.
Does this concede much to Gale? Not really. Descriptions and individual intentions matter more on this view than on Alston's, but the
points made earlier against the necessity of a descriptive backing for
coreference still stand, and Alston's overall position that direct reference
is <genetically) more fundamental than definite descriptions hasn't been
touched. 62 Similarly, accepting an Evans-like modification to Alston's
theory of reference will leave intact the idea that referential success has
little to do with the "fit" of associated desccriptions. 63 The result will be
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a more complex, less linear version of the historical-causal theory-one
according to which reference, although transmitted causally, is repeatedly refixed, both via descriptions, and via experiences the intentional
objects of which are taken to satisfy those descriptions.

Summary
We have attempted to sort out several distinct objections contained in
Gale's argument against the applicability of a direct reference theory to
theological statements. First of all, the Non-Ostensibility Objection isn't
really an objection to causal theories of reference per se, but only to
indexical elements in such. The objection could stand against the veridicality of religious experiences without having any bearing on what role
such experiences play in the overall religious language-game. The
Definition Objection fails to stand as an independent objection because
Gale has to prove that coreference across meaning-shifts must occur for
different reasons in the case of 'God' than it does in the case of naturalkind terms, and none of the remaining objections succeed at supplying
the needed proof. The Ontological Presuppositions Objection falsely
assumes that a causal theory of reference cannot explain shared meaning
in the absence of an existing referent, while the Biblical Illiteracy
Objection, begs the question by covertly assuming the truth of descriptivism. The strongest of the objections we have considered, the Opinion
Poll Objection, applies specifically to conclusions Alston draws from his
version of direct reference theory. It must assume both that, in general,
people have an accurate, intuitive grasp as to how reference actually
works in the language-games they play, and that Alston's inferences are
inescapably correct as to the hypothetical consequence in question.
This concludes my remarks concerning Gale on this topic. There are
other important issues concerning theology and direct reference that
could be addressed, but such questions are beyond the scope of this
paper. What has been at issue is a collection of objections to the idea
that any predominantly causal theory of reference could hold as regards
'God' and its cognates, and, possibly also, an objection to considering
religious experience as a constitutive part of an over-all religious language-game, and thus to treating religious experience's contribution to
religious belief as on a par with sensory experience's contribution to our
knowledge of the physical world. It may be that other reasons for
embracing descriptivism as regards the reference of 'God' have been
overlooked. But, if the conclusions presented in this paper are correct,
then at least we know where the issue is not to be joined.
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NOTES
1. Richard M. Gale 1991, On the Nature and Existence of God (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press).
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2. This epistemology, which was developed in a series of articles during
the eighties, has recently been superseded in Alston 1991, Perceiving God: The
Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
3. Hereafter such practices will be referred to as doxastic practices.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein 1953, Philosophicallnvestigations (New York:
Macmillan Publishing); Wittgenstein 1972, On Certainty (New York: Harper
& Row).
5. Alston 1991,153-155.
6. Ibid., 7.
7. Gale 1991, 300. Gale's expectation that some experiential basis be
"constitutive" of religious doxastic practice is the requirement that the former be essential, either as a part or as a cause of the latter. He regards the
putative difference between religious and sensory experience thus identified
to be one of series of cognitively invidious disanalogies showing that religious experiences are not knowledge-yielding. In this paper, however, our
concern is only with how Gale's arguments concerning reference affect the
Alstonian assessment of religious experience's centrality to the religious
form of life.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. Alston actually has a second reply to the objection, given Gale's
presuppositions about the paradigmatic status of sense perception. Alston
could accuse Gale of "epistemic chauvinism."
10. "Referring to God," reprinted in Alston 1989, Divine Nature and
Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press); see especially 106-107.
11. Alston 1989, 103.
12. Gale 1991,5.
13. Gale 1991, 7-8; 1993b, 4.
14. Alston 1989, 109.
15. Gale 1991, 6-7. Alston's theory is "historical" in its emphasis on
chains of social transmission that guarantee intentional identity or coreferential usage between speakers. It is "indexical" in that it presupposes an
ostensive "baptism" by which the reference is originally fixed.
16. Ibid. Gale (or, perhaps, his typesetter) uses double quotes when
mentioning a term. In this paper, single quotes will be used for this purpose.
17. Gale 1993, "Reply to Andrew Jeffery," unpublished remarks at the
Central Division Meeting of the APA in Chicago, 2.
18. Ibid. This classification of Alston's view as external rather than
indexical seems to be mistaken. Consider the following passage from
Alston 1989, 108:
We will think of a non-derivative reference to God as secured by
labeling something presented in experience. This presupposes, of
course, that God can be presented to one's experience in such a way
that one can make a name the name of God just by using that name
to label an object of experience.
19. Gale 1991, 7. Gale regards power and benevolence (and, perhaps,
omnipotence and moral perfection) as revisable, "soft core" properties
presently taken to be determinative of the more essential, high-level "hard
core" properties, supreme greatness and worthiness of worship (ibid, 8).
20. Ibid,8.
21. Ibid., 6. George Bealer argues that meaning-shift theories like the
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one described by Gale are incompatible with the kind of essentialism that
has been associated with causal accounts of reference such as Kripke's. See
Bealer 1987, "The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism,"
Philosophical Perspectives 1, Metaphysics: 306-308. In this I think Bealer is only
partly right. He is correct in arguing that scientists did not merely stipulate,
rather than discover, that water was H20 or that heat was molecular motion.
Thus these metaphysical necessities are not instances of pure a priori knowledge. But this is not to say that meaning-shifts, following such a posteriori
discoveries, have not occurred. Actual usage must be the final court of
appeal for questions of meaning, and, in archaic usage, to take another
example Bealer cites, the extension of the class fish really did include whales.
So the meaning of 'fish' has shifted in the wake of scientific "precisification,"
but a precisification grounded in an empirical discovery about the essence of
the natural kind whale.
22. See Saul A. Kripke 1972, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press), 134-135; and Kripke 1979, "Speaker's Reference
and Semantic Reference," in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and
Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Contemporary Perspectives ill the Philosophy of
Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 25 n27.
23. Gale 1991,326-343.
24. Corey Washington suggests that since we live in a pluralistic society,
we can neither assume that our students employ any conception of god in
common, nor that their uses of 'god' corefer in virtue of any common history.
But the disagreements in question are not limited to those who come from
different cultures, as the next point about the theological elite makes clear.
25. See for instance Coburn 1988, "Metaphysical Theology and the Life
of Faith," Philosophical Investigations 11:3 (March): 197-198.
26. Kripke 1972: 57ft, 135.
27. Ibid, 135.
28. This is what he means when he says he disputes Mill's view that general terms have "connotations" (ibid).
29. Ibid, 59. Because of this distinction I will endeavor throughout the
rest of this discussion to discriminate between the loaded Fregean term
'sense', having the connotation of a description that gives the meaning alld
reference of a term, and simple descriptive meaning.
30. The sensible properties of gold in virtue of which we originally fix
the reference of the term 'gold' would seem to be good examples of "highlevel, emergent properties" gold has only in virtue of other, lower-level (but
essential and therefore necessary) properties. The difference between the
sensible properties of 'gold' and the hard core properties associated with
God is that the latter set of properties are allegedly possessed by their object
necessarily, whereas those by which we fix the reference 'gold' across possible worlds are had by gold contingently in relation to the sensory apparti we
possess and the environment we share with the metal as a reference-fixing
species.
31. The additional element, Gale would say, is supplied by the "overrider function" played by these hard core properties. The best evidence that
'God' has a sense such that some of its elements play such a role will be discussed when we come to the Opinion Poll Objection below. Gale's hybrid
theory of reference, with its insistence reference, even if causally transmitted, requires a minimal condition of fit between the associated concepts of
two speakers, is reminiscent of the theory of reference proposed in Gareth
Evans 1973, "The Causal Theory of Names," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society: Supplementary Volume 47: 187-208. Reprinted in A. P. Martinich, ed.
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1990, The Philosophy of Language, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University
Press). All references are to the reprint (301).
32. lowe the present formulation of this objection to Robert Coburn and
Charles Marks.
33. Kripke 1979, 14-15.
34. Ibid, 14 (including n20).
35. Ibid, 15.
36. In such a case it would not be analytically true, under that description, that "God" possessed such properties-even if it was, nevertheless, a
necessary truth about the being one had encountered.
37. Gale, 7-10. Many contemporary theists share very different a priori
intuitions about how God could possibly behave from those an ancient
Hebrew would have had, yet would not scruple to allow that that Hebrew
referred to the same deity.
38. Gale 1991, 8.
39. Ibid. lowe this insight to Genoveva Marti.
40. Evans 1973, 296-297.
41. Ibid., 298.
42. Keith S. Donnellan 1974, "Speaking of Nothing/' The Philosophical
Review 83:1 (January),23.
43. Ibid., see especially 27-30.
44. Alston 1989, 110-111.
45. Gale 1991, 301.
46. Donnellan 1974, 24-25.
47. See Kripke 1979.
48. From private correspondence with the author, March 1993. But see
Gale 1971, "The Fictive Use of Language," Philosophy 46 (October), esp. 328330. For a critique of the view that the fictive use of language involves a
special type of illocutionary act, see John R. Searle, "The Logical Status of
Fictional Discourse," in French, Peter A., Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and
Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) 1979, Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy
of Language (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). 1979, esp. 236-237.
49. Kripke 1972, 157.
50. Kripke 1979,24 n20.
51. Evans 1973, 300.
52. Alston 1989, 113.
53. Ibid., 113-114.
54. Ibid., 114.
55. The New Encylopaedia Britannica, 15th ed. (1991), s. v. "Unicorn."
56. Another possible problem, raised by one this journal's referees, runs
as follows:
The direct reference theorist thinks that when, say, the Hebrews of
old had experiences they took to be of God, they dubbed the thing
they were experiencing God; hence the term 'God' (the Hebrew
equivalent) is designated as 'the cause of our religious experience.'
The problem is ... that it is uncontroversial that there is some cause
of their experience. But now suppose that the cause of their religious experience is merely a psychological mechanism that functions to help us keep our sanity in a world that we cannot control.
But then 'God' refers to this mechanism. The question is, if one
accepts something like the baptism view of fixing the reference of
'God,' then it's hard to say how 'atheism' (the claim that there is no
God) could be true.
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It seems to me, however, that this problem is not terribly serious.
Atheists would surely reply that their intention is to deny the existence of
anything fitting the metaphysical descriptions which theists attach to the
term 'God.' Alston himself takes genetic challenges to religious belief, such
as the one implied in the above story, as gaining significance under a direct
reference theory (Alston 1989, 115).
57. Ibid, 112.
58. Evans 1973, 303.
59. Ibid,303-5.
60. Ibid, 300. Evans is quoting from Issac Taylor 1898, Names and Their
Histor1!.
61.' Kripke 1972,132.
62. Alston gives two reasons for supposing direct reference to be genetically more basic than descriptivist reference:

First ... almost all uniquely identifying predicates themselves contain one or more singular referring expressions .... Second, and
more crucial, the use of a description to pick out a referent presupposes the mastery of a referential apparatus. For I refer descriptively by taking myself to be speaking of whatever uniquely satisfies
certain predicates. And how could I understand that notion of
something's satisfying a predicate without already having made
some singular references, or at least having acquired the ability to
do so? [Ibid,109-110.]
63. Evans 1973, 301, 306.
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